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Non technical summary
In the European Union the raw wage gap between women and men amounts
to 16% on average. In order to assess a gender wage gap adjusted for male
and female characteristics, particularly two main methodological issues have to
be considered. First, male and female wage equations have to be estimated
consistently. This requires proper treatment of self-selection into the labour
market. In other words, those working may not form a random subgroup of the
(sampled) population but differ systematically, in unobservable aspects, from
those not employed. The second issue concerns the appropriate decomposition
of the gender pay gap, that allows meaningful interpretation of its components.
In this study we propose different techniques to assess the gender pay gap
while exploring different estimation methods for the wage equations, and differ-
ent decomposition approaches for the wage gap. We concentrate on the estima-
tion methods most often used in the gender gap literature (OLS and Heckman),
and also use a recently developed estimator (Lewbel 2002). These procedures
differ in the treatment of self-selection. We decompose the pay gap both at
the mean, following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and across the wage
distribution, as proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993).
The empirical application, based on the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) for the five largest European countries (France, Germany, Italy,
Spain and the United Kingdom), shows that at most half of the difference in
earnings between the sexes can be attributed to differences in characteristics.
This confirms the findings of other studies, such as the report Employment in
Europe 2002 (European Commission 2002a). However, the size of this endow-
ment effect differs considerably between countries and depends on the choice
of estimator. Our results suggest that correcting for self-selection has a sig-
nificant impact on both the wage estimates and the pay gap decomposition.
Furthermore, the results are sensitive to the choice of estimator, that is to the
way self-selection in estimation is treated. We recommend the Lewbel approach
because it imposes fewer arbitrary restrictions on the model than the Heckman
approach, and performs better in terms of predictions with our data.
Another main result of the study is derived from the pay gap decomposition
over quantiles of the wage distribution. Remarkable differences are revealed
within as well as between countries. A further recommendation derived from
our analysis would therefore be to pay careful attention to differences over the
wage distribution when drawing policy conclusions. Focusing only on the mean
pay gap may conceal politically relevant aspects of the problem.
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Abstract
We investigate different techniques to assess the gender pay gap in five EU
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom), focusing
on self-selection into market work. Results show that selectivity correc-
tion has an impact on both wage estimates and wage gap decomposition.
If there is a positive correlation between the wage and the propensity
to participate, the estimated pay gap understates the true difference in
earnings when self-selection is ignored. The estimated pay gap differs con-
siderably at different quantiles of the wage distribution, and is sensitive
to the choice of estimator.
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1 Introduction
Gender gaps in employment, earnings and career progression have been on the
European Union’s policy agenda for several decades. Despite repeated com-
mitments to promote gender equality, e.g. through the European Employment
Strategy and national governmental measures, women are still less favoured on
the labour market than men. In 1998 women’s average gross hourly earnings
amounted to 76% - 94% of men’s earnings throughout the European Union (Eu-
ropean Commission 2002a). Women encounter more difficulties in their career
progression and are less likely to be promoted (OECD Employment Outlook
2002). They are under-represented in managerial occupations and in jobs with
a supervisory role.
Although the observed or raw difference in wages between men and women
provides an overall picture of the actual gender pay gap, encompassing both
differences in endowments and differences in remuneration, it is worthwhile to
analyse the factors related to the raw wage gap in more detail. On average,
men and women have different human capital endowments. To start with, men
and women differ in their education levels and tracks. Second, women and
men have quite distinct work histories. Traditionally, women are more likely to
interrupt gainful employment for family reasons, leading to less work experience
compared with men and loss of human capital. The quasi totality of part-time
jobs are occupied by women, and their overall participation rate remains steadily
below that of men. Finally, the segregation of men and women with respect to
occupation or industry may explain a part of the wage gap. Empirical studies
consider these differences by estimating an adjusted pay gap that controls for
individual and job characteristics. However, many published studies fail to take
account of important methodological issues.
The aim of our study is to explain the difference in earnings by gender and
improve the analysis of the factors related to the gender pay gap in the European
Union. Our focus is a methodological one. The typical procedure when esti-
mating pay gaps is to first investigate the determinants of women’s and men’s
wages and then use the empirical results in order to draw conclusions on differ-
ences in the wage formation processes of women and men. Thereby, two issues
have to be dealt with. First, male and female wage equations have to be esti-
mated consistently. This requires proper treatment of methodological problems
such as, for instance, self-selection into participation. This problem arises if the
working individuals do not form a random subgroup of the sample population
but differ systematically, in unobservable aspects of preferences, opportunities,
and productivity, from those not employed. The second methodological issue
discussed here concerns the appropriate decomposition of the gender pay gap in
the presence of self-selection.
As regards obtaining consistent estimates for the returns to endowments,
other important issues do arise, of course. A prominent one concerns the po-
tential endogeneity of several of the variables typically included in the list of
endowments, and unobserved heterogeneity also deserves a mention. While ac-
knowledging these methodological issues, our focus here is deliberately on the
treatment of self-selection both in estimation and in wage gap decomposition.1
1We nevertheless document attempts to control for unobserved heterogeneity and for endo-
geneity in our report (Beblo et al. 2003). However, due to the very low variation over time of
the meaningful variables, panel data techniques controlling also for self-selectivity, Wooldridge
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We use a new microeconometric approach to estimate wages for women and
men that takes account of the selection process into the labour market. The
Lewbel estimator (Lewbel 2002), allows us to derive consistent wage estimates
for women and men under less stringent assumptions than those required for
consistencey of Heckman’s estimator. We also provide new empirical evidence
on the gender pay gap in Europe by using different decomposition methods
while drawing on comparable data for all EU countries. Our study therefore
complements previous work published in Employment in Europe 2002, Employ-
ment Outlook 2002 and by the Group of Experts on Gender and Employment
(European Commission 2002b), while stressing the self-selection issue.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents stylised facts on the
unadjusted pay gap in EU countries, introduces the estimation methods we im-
plement for the wage equations, and describes the decompositions of the wage
gap we use. Thereby, the main focus is on proper treatment of self-selection
in the data. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 provides empirical
evidence. The variety of econometric procedures, including OLS, Heckman two-
step and Lewbel estimators, and the different wage gap decomposition issues, are
illustrated with German data. In addition, we provide estimation and decompo-
sition results based on cross-section Lewbel estimates for the other four largest
EU member states (France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom). The pay
gap decomposition results presented for all countries are based on the methods
proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1993). Section 5 concludes.
2 Analysing gender pay gaps
This section first presents stylised facts on gender earnings in EU countries.
It introduces the estimation methods we implement for the wage equations.
Finally we describe the decompositions of the wage gap used.
2.1 The unadjusted pay gap in EU countries
We start off by taking a look at the raw or unadjusted gender gap in gross
earnings across the EU (details on the data are given in Section 4). According
to the ECHP and as listed in Table 1, the average hourly wage gap between
women and men in the EU varies between 6.5% in Portugal and 26.5% in the
United Kingdom.
While these aggregate numbers give us a first idea of the gender pay gap in
the EU countries, they conceal the prevalence of wage differences for different
groups within each country. The distribution of the gender gap for each country
is given in Figure 1. The raw wage gap is displayed by percentiles according to
the wage rankings of all women and men in the respective country sample. The
graphs highlight the fact that the wage distributions of women and men are not
typically congruent, that is, male wages are usually more spread.
(1995), Kyriazidou (1997) and Lewbel (2002), failed to produce meaningful results. The lack
of suitable instruments in the ECHP thwarted our attempt to account satisfactorily for sec-
toral information (in particular employment in the public sector). Results obtained with the
available instruments were not significant at all.
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Table 1: Average raw wage gap between men and women in the EU countries
Country absolute wage gap relative wage gap
(euro) (%)
Austria 2.13 20.1
Belgium 0.98 7.7
Denmark 1.72 11.7
France 1.44 13.0
Finland 1.81 17.7
Germany 2.68 21.0
Greece 0.72 9.5
Ireland 2.48 20.2
Italy 0.67 6.8
The Netherlands 3.70 22.1
Portugal 0.38 6.5
Spain 1.37 14.9
United Kingdom 3.38 26.5
EU 1.82 16.3
Data source: ECHP, country files 1998. Sample of 25-55 year old women and men,
who are employed at least 8 hours per week. Data for Sweden and Luxembourg are
not available.
Note: Absolute wage gap = Male minus female average gross hourly wages in euro.
Relative wage gap = Absolute wage gap / average male wage rate.
We use the individual and country weights (ratio of sample size and size of the popula-
tion 16 years and above) provided in the ECHP for all graphs and descriptive statistics
in the paper.
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We can distinguish three main groups of patterns: a decreasing, an increas-
ing and a U-shaped distribution of the raw wage gap. While the Scandinavian
countries Denmark and Finland have increasing wage differences, Southern Eu-
ropean countries, e.g. Italy and Portugal, and Ireland show a decreasing pat-
tern. The Netherlands provide an extreme example of a U-shape. Portugal is
the only country where the wage gap curve drops below zero (for higher earn-
ings). There is a small glass ceiling effect for some countries, for example Ireland
and the Netherlands, in the sense that the wealthiest part of the (wage-earning)
population is composed largely of men.
The unadjusted wage gap provides an aggregate measure of the earnings
inequality between men and women. It compounds differences in characteristics
and differences in the remuneration of these characteristics (as well as potential
direct and indirect discrimination). Investigating the components of the gender
pay gap separately will be helpful, in particular if the aim is to better target
policy measures at reducing the earnings gap.
2.2 The adjusted pay gap: methodological issues
The ways in which the factors related to a pay gap are analysed in the literature
are diverse. The crudest approach consists in including a sex dummy in a single
wage regression for women and men. The underlying assumption here is that
female and male wages differ by a fixed amount (shift parameter), but that
human capital characteristics and other explanatory variables have the same
impact on women’s and men’s wages.
A more flexible approach to investigate the earnings gap has been derived
from human capital theory (Mincer 1958, 1974, Becker 1964), where an indi-
vidual’s wage rate reflects the productivity potential based on various human
capital characteristics. According to Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), any
wage differential between two groups of people (defined by gender, race, ethnic-
ity, etc.) can therefore be decomposed into two parts. The first is explained by
differences in observable human capital endowments and other job-related vari-
ables between both groups (endowment effect), the second reflects differences in
the values that are assigned to women’s and men’s characteristics, that is the
prices or remuneration of these endowments (remuneration effect). This latter
part of the wage differential is often interpreted as an estimate of wage discrim-
ination.2 Most empirical studies estimate an adjusted pay gap that controls
for these variables and thereby accounts for the observed differences in personal
and job characteristics of women and men.
The wage decomposition suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oacaxa (1973) has
been subject to criticism on two points at least. First, their method is based on
the endowment prices of one of the sexes (the male in most applications), thereby
introducing a potential dissymmetry in the effects depending on which gender
is considered as the reference. To overcome this problem, Reimers (1983) and
2There is an ongoing debate on the interpretation of the gender wage gap or parts of it as
discrimination. On the one hand, the different endowments of women and men may already
be the result of discrimination because of feedback effects (see e.g. European Commission
2002c). On the other hand, the residual (“unexplained”) part of the gap may still consist of
unobserved differences in human capital characteristics. Due to these ambiguities we prefer
not to speak of discrimination, and neither of an “explained” or “unexplained” part of the
gap, but use the terms endowment and remuneration effect instead (as well as other effects to
be introduced later on).
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Figure 1: Distribution of the raw wage gap in the EU countries
Data source: ECHP, country files 1998. Sample of 25-55 year old women and men,
who are employed at least 8 hours per week. Data for Sweden and Luxembourg are
not available.
Note: Male minus female gross hourly wage rate per percentile of the wage distribution.7
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) use a matrix combination of both female and male
prices in decomposing the wages. A more important problem, in our view, is
that the Oaxaca and Blinder proposal considers only wage decomposition at the
mean, thus occulting potential variations of the different effects over the wage
distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have developed a method that
sheds light on the profile of the wage gap across the whole wage distribution.
Since each of these gender pay gap decompositions is based on the estima-
tion of wage equations, it is important to use a consistent, and possibly efficient,
estimation technique. The better the wage determination process can be iden-
tified, the more knowledge about the factors related to the gender pay gap can
be gained, and the better policy measures can be targeted. The following sec-
tion therefore introduces different methods for both wage estimation and wage
decomposition.
The remainder of this section is organised in three parts. First, different
wage regression models are presented, notably those handling self selection. In
particular, we describe a new estimator proposed by Lewbel (2002). Second,
different decomposition techniques of the gender wage gap are discussed. A final
subsection discusses how self selection may be treated when decomposing the
wage gap. For more details on the methodological aspects and a review of the
literature on gender wage gaps we refer to (Beblo et al. 2003).
2.2.1 Estimation of wage equations
We assume the following log-linear wage regression model:
lnWJi = X
J
i βJ + εJi , J =M,F , (1)
where lnWi is the logarithmic wage. Vector Xi contains the set of Mincerian
explanatory variables augmented of job attributes, labour market features and
demographic characteristics.3 εi is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic error term with mean
zero and constant variance σ2ε. i indexes individuals within the male (M) and
female (F ) samples. For simplicity the index on gender (J = M,F ) will be
skipped hereafter, when not explicitly needed.
Most studies on gender pay gaps use a simple OLS regression for the wage
estimation, arguing that only working individuals are considered. However, if
a significant part of the sample is not working, endogenous selection does arise
if unobservables in the wage and in the participation equations are correlated,
and this requires proper treatment.
Heckman (1979) proposed two estimation techniques to overcome the self-
selection problem, one consisting in maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of a
selection model assuming bivariate normality of the error terms in the wage and
participation equations. The other method proceeds in two steps, ML probit
estimation of the participation equation, and OLS (or GLS) estimation of the
wage equation using participants only and the normal hazard λˆ estimated from
3Heckman et al. (2003) provide a profound critique of this approach, underlining the im-
portant differences that arise between cohort-based and cross-sectional estimates of returns
to schooling, as well as the crucial roles of expectation formation and sequential resolution of
uncertainty.
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the first step as additional regressor. For further reference, note that this is a
decreasing function of the participation probability.4
Lest identification be obtained by arbitrary functional form restrictions, both
procedures require the availability of valid instruments, i.e. variables which con-
tribute to determining the propensity to work but are not related to wages. In
practice, such exclusion restrictions are difficult to find and collinearity prob-
lems are likely to prevail. Furthermore, the consistency of the two-step estimator
hinges on the correct specification of the normal hazard as additional regres-
sor. In order to circumvent this latter restriction, other correction terms have
been suggested in the literature, such as the propensity of participating (Olsen
1980). In the latter approach the propensity score instead of the normal hazard
is included in the wage equation. An empirical survey about various correction
terms is provided in Vella (1998).5
To obviate the self selection problem in a less restrictive way than the Heck-
man correction, we propose to use the endogenous sample selection model in-
troduced by Lewbel (2002) which, to our knowledge, has not yet been applied
to the estimation of gender wage gaps. It provides a two stage least squares
estimator of the coefficients, where regressors are allowed to be endogenous,
mismeasured, or otherwise correlated with the model errors. Unlike the Heck-
man two-step estimator, no structure is imposed on the distribution of the error
terms, permitting a more general form of unknown heteroscedasticity. The es-
timator does not even require an estimation of the selection equation, in other
words the participation decision. Yet, the latter may be estimated separately in
order to gain information on the factors influencing the labour market activity
of women and men in Europe.
In the Lewbel procedure, identification is obtained by observing a “special”
variable S. S is supposed to be continuously distributed with large support.
The selection process is assumed monotonic in S. The special variable affects
participation in otherwise unspecified ways but does not affect the dependent
variable. Hence S can be interpreted as an instrument for participation. Here,
an appropriate choice for S may be the unearned income of the individual.
Define
W =
I
f(S|U) , (2)
where I is the participation indicator, f(S|U) is the conditional probability
density function of S given U , where U is a subset of the variables in X. If X
contains endogenous variables these should be instrumented.
In a first stage, f(S|U) is estimated either parametrically or non-parametric-
ally. Lewbel shows that, by using f(S|U) as a weighting function in the wage
4There are two reasons to prefer two-stage estimation to the direct ML estimation of the
Heckman model. First, ML relies on joint normality of the errors in the selection and level
equations. Its advantages and drawbacks are twofold: if none of the equations is misspecified,
simultaneous estimation yields efficiency gains. On the other hand, misspecification of one
equation may contaminate the other, resulting in inconsistency. By contrast, the two-step
estimator only relies on conditional moments which, although derived under joint normality,
may hold for a wider class of distributions, at least approximately. Second, using OLS in the
second stage has the advantage that the average of the residual is zero, which does not hold
for the ML Heckman estimator.
5 In Beblo et al. (2003), we used both the predicted linear index and the normal hazard
(separately), and found very similar results with both approaches.
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estimation of the second stage, one can obtain a consistent estimator for the
β-parameters of the wage equation, either by least squares or by instrumental
variable estimation if some of the regressors are endogenous.
In our application, we compare the cross-section estimates obtained from the
endogenous sample selection model by Lewbel, using the non-earned income of
the household as the special variable S, with those resulting from OLS esti-
mation and Heckman two-step estimation. We choose the German sample as
a reference sample. For the remaining four countries we use the Lewbel pro-
cedure only. Concentrating on the cross-section Lewbel model, we are able to
disentangle the components of the gender pay gap while considering at least the
most prevailing of the methodological problems discussed above, that is, taking
account of the selection effect in a non-restrictive way.
2.2.2 Decomposition of the gender wage gap
The general procedure of all decomposition methods is that, first of all, wage
equations are estimated using individual and other characteristics, such as firm
characteristics, as explanatory variables. The estimated price vector bβ and the
average human capital and job characteristics for males and females are used to
compute weighted differences in mean characteristics. This part of the wage gap
is assumed to reflect productivity differences. We call it the endowment effect.
The adjusted pay gap is then measured as the difference between the total wage
differential observed and the fraction explained by differences in human capital
endowments of women and men. This remaining part measures differences in the
remuneration of the characteristics. We call this second term the remuneration
effect.6
Suppose wages are estimated without bias, i.e.:
lnW
J
= X
JbβJ , ∀ J =M,F , (3)
where X is the sample mean of X. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) propose
to decompose the raw wage gap as followsn
lnW
M − lnWF
o
| {z }
raw wage gap
=
n
lnW
M − lnW ∗F
o
+
n
lnW ∗
F − lnWF
o
(4)
=
³
X
M −XF
´ bβM| {z }
endowment effect
+X
F
³bβM − bβF´| {z } ,
remuneration effect
6 It is important to stress that the decomposition into endowment and remuneration effects
is conditioned by the list of explanatory variables included in the wage regression. Beyond the
endogeneity problems already touched upon, a problem of variable selection thus arises. An
extreme view is that “all relevant variables measuring individuals’ productive endowments”
should be included (Berndt 1991, p. 184). A more pragmatic strategy when elaborating policy
recommendations could be to involve the policy makers in the definition of the explanotory
variables to be used. A prevailing opinion, already expressed by Oaxaca (1973), seems to
be that the greater the number of control variables is, the smaller the endowment effect will
be. While the accumulated empirical evidence tends to support that opinion we would like to
stress that it is by no means guaranteed that including more regressors has that effect. An
extreme example is given by the Italian case: the endowment effect is negative (see Section
4).
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where lnW∗
F
= X
F bβM .7 Here bβM is taken as the non-discriminating wage
structure. The first term lnW
M − lnW ∗F indicates the hypothetical wage dif-
ferential if women had the same wage structure as men. The second term
lnW ∗
F − lnWF shows the distance between the hypothetical wage rate for
women and their actual mean wage. When using female prices bβF or a weighted
price vector as reference, the wage decomposition results may differ. These vari-
ations and the empirical consequences of using them are discussed in detail in
the study of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).
Going beyond the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean, and taking a
closer look at the wage differential by quantiles of the wage distribution provides
additional information on the nature of gender earnings inequality. This is done
in the method developed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), which also takes
the residual wage distribution into account. The main feature of the Juhn-
Murphy-Pierce approach is the decomposition of the raw gap at different points
of the wage distribution. Consequently this decomposition method allows an
analysis at the quantile level:
∆lnWq| {z }
raw wage gap
= (X
M
q −X
F
q )
bβM| {z }
endowment effect
+ X
F
q (
bβM − bβF )| {z }
remuneration effect
+ (εMq − εFq )| {z }
unobservable effect
, (5)
where Xq represents the sample mean of X for quantile q. The Juhn-Murphy-
Pierce decomposition has been applied mostly in studies analysing the wage gap
between two groups of workers over time or across countries.
In our application we compute the Oaxaca-Blinder and Juhn-Murphy-Pierce
decompositions based on the wage estimations selected. We use the estimates
from the male wage regressions as the reference remuneration, that is, as the
non-discriminatory salary structure. As Ginther and Hayes (2003) point out,
men are the usual comparison group in legal proceedings concerning gender
discrimination. Hence a pooled approach, obtained from a (matrix) weighted
average of the male and female wage structures, is not likely to be used in legal
cases concerned with equal opportunities for women and men.
2.2.3 Treatment of the sample selection correction
This section discusses how to handle the selectivity bias correction within the
decomposition of the raw wage gap. In the following, the decomposition method
is applied for the case where a selection bias correction is performed for both
sexes. If a random sample for men is assumed, the correction term is set to zero.
We first consider the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and Heckman two-step
estimates. When applying the Heckman two-step regression technique, we are
able to distinguish the endowment and remuneration effects from a selection
effect. This gives us an idea of how the wage distribution of women, and hence
the wage gap, would look like in the absence of sample selection. The selection
7Note that the fact that the unweighted average of estimation residuals is zero does not
necessarily imply the same property for the corresponding weighted average. However, em-
pirically, we have found the weighted averages to be negligible, and have omitted them in the
presentation for simplicity.
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correction terms enter the wage decomposition as follows:
∆lnW| {z }
raw wage gap
= (X
M −XF )bβM| {z }
endowment effect
+ X
F
(bβM − bβF )| {z }
remuneration effect
+ (bλMbθM − bλFbθF )| {z }
selection effect
, (6)
where bθ is an estimate of ρσε. The first two terms of the right-hand side in
equation (6) are the familiar endowment and remuneration components.
However, it is not obvious how the last term in equation (6) should be treated
in the overall decomposition scheme, that is, whether it should be attributed
to differences in endowments or included in the remuneration effect. Several
variants are found in the literature.
In most studies, the last term on the right-hand side of the equation (6) is
subtracted from the observed wage gap on the left-hand side. In this form the
left-hand side provides a measure of the difference in potential or offered wages,
in contrast to observed wages realized only by those participating in the labour
market (see among others Oglobin 1999).8 The studies which proceed in this
way find that the existence of a sample selection bias implies that the “offered
wage gap” greatly exceeds the observed wage gap. However, this empirical
result is obtained with bθM = 0 and bθF > 0 (no selection for men, positive
selection for women, that is, positive correlation between unobservables in the
wage and participation equations) and is therefore by no means general. Note
also that with other selectivity correction approaches, the relative magnitude
of the offered and observed wage gap may not relate directly to the sign of a
coefficient. With Olsen’s (1980) approach, for instance, the additional regressor
designed to correct for selection is the predicted linear index of the participation
equation. Given that this is inversely related to the normal hazard included in
the Heckman correction, one expects a negative coefficient for this regressor.
However, the sign of the mean of the participation index can differ depending
on the participation rate.
Thus the impact on the remuneration and endowment effects of taking the
correction of sample selection into account, is ambiguous. For instance in the
investigation of Oglobin (1999) both the remuneration and the endowment ef-
fects decline in comparison with the results of an OLS regression. But both
effects increase in the study of Miller (1987). Miller und Rummery (1991) show
that the effects may point in opposite directions. In their study the endowment
effect declines and the remuneration effect increases.
Dolton and Makepeace (1986) treat the correction term as a regular explana-
tory variable. The difference in bλ between men and women weighted with bθM
enters into the endowment effect. The distance between the estimated coeffi-
cients for the correction term add to the remuneration effect. In contrast to this,
Dolton and Kidd (1994) and Choudhury (1993) choose a decomposition similar
to equation (6) and interpret the third term as representing the appropriate
correction for non-random sampling.
Summarising, sample selection may be taken into account in various ways.
It is not possible to point out any of these as the right one, since the appropriate
procedure depends on the specific empirical problem and the data at hand, as
discussed by Neuman and Oaxaca (2001). However, empirical studies largely
8The offered wage coincides with the observed wage for participants, but is not observed
for non-participants.
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support the significance of the selection bias correction, particularly for women.
Following Dolton and Kidd (1994) and Choudhury (1993), we will treat the
selectivity bias as an additional effect to the endowment, remuneration (and
unobservables) effects. Equation (6) can be straightforwardly extended to the
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition.
Contrary to OLS or Heckman two-step estimators (at least the OLS ver-
sion of the latter), the sample mean of the unobservables (ε) is not zero for the
Lewbel estimator. Thus, even a wage decomposition at the mean yields an un-
observables effect if we use Lewbel estimates. This effect cannot be interpreted
straightforwardly. However, it may capture part of the selection effect.
3 Data
Our empirical analyses are based on data from the user data base of the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel (ECHP UDB, version December 2002). In
order to meet the requirement of more in-depth knowledge and greater compat-
ibility of data on social and economic conditions in the European Union, the
ECHP was launched as a closely coordinated component of a system of house-
hold surveys. The ECHP is a standardized survey conducted in member states
of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the Euro-
pean Communities.9 It involves annual interviews of a representative panel of
households and individuals in each country, covering a wide range of topics on
living conditions. This includes comparable information across member states,
on income, work and employment, poverty and exclusion, housing, health, and
many other social indicators. The key feature of the ECHP is harmonisation of
its methodology, specifically through the creation of a centralised questionnaire
which serves as a point of departure for all national surveys. The ECHP is
thus a rich data set, providing a wide range of information for investigating the
distribution of wage income within and across European countries. Despite its
merits, the ECHP involves restrictions when analyzing employment and wages
in many ways. For example, sectors, education and children information as well
the income sources are very aggregated. Nevertheless, the comparable nature
of the ECHP data permits a cross-country analysis for the EU member states
on the highest compatibility level available.
We select our estimation samples according to the following criteria. We
include respondents from all nationalities, aged 25 to 55, who are presently
employed or out of the labour force. The quite restrictive selection on age is
made to prevent the results from being excessively affected by education and
early retirement decisions that may influence participation behaviour and differ
between countries. We exclude the self-employed and people working in family
businesses because of the difficulty to obtain credible information on earned
income for these categories. Unemployed workers, pensioners, students, those in
special training programs or national service (military or civil) as well as people
with a disability are excluded, too. These restrictions are justified by the aim
to form a fairly homogeneous sample of employed persons and individuals who
are “voluntarily” out of the labour force.
9For a detailed description of the ECHP methodology and questionnaires see Eurostat
(1996).
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Table 2: Sample sizes of the ECHP country files
Country # women % working # men % working
Austria 1,343 70 1,270 100
Belgium 1,144 79 1,076 99
Denmark 963 97 985 100
France 2,260 70 1,935 97
Finland 1,431 92 1,310 100
Germany 2,608 77 2,576 99
Greece 1,680 47 1,206 100
Ireland 1,407 58 969 99
Italy 3,235 53 2,506 99
The Netherlands 2,069 82 2,147 99
Portugal 1,943 72 1,778 100
Spain 2,616 49 2,176 99
United Kingdom 2,166 82 1,740 99
EU 24,865 69 21,677 99
Data source: ECHP, country files 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women and men,
who are employed or out of the labour force.
Furthermore, we restrain wage earners to have positive earnings and work
for at least 8 hours per week. This last restriction aims at minimising measure-
ment errors connected with the wage measure. Wages are not observed directly,
but obtained by dividing current monthly total gross earnings by the current
total number of hours worked per week in main and additional jobs, the latter
multiplied by 4.3. It turns out that outliers in the resulting wage distribution
correspond to individuals reporting very low hours of work. Observations with
missing information on household net income — required to model participation
— do not enter the analysis. The remaining sample sizes for all ECHP coun-
try files are listed in Table 2. Total sample sizes range from more than 3000
women and 2500 men in the Italian sample to less than 1000 women and men for
Denmark. In these samples, the female participation rates differ considerably
between countries, while male participation rates are near to 100% in almost
every country. The female participation rate is particularly low in the South of
Europe (Spain, Italy and Greece), while it is remarkably high in the Scandina-
vian countries Denmark and Finland. Also remarkable are the unbalanced sizes
of the selected samples between the sexes in Southern Europe. One explana-
tion is that men are more often self-employed in rural activities or in services
and are therefore excluded. On the other hand, women, especially mothers, are
more likely not to participate and thus are kept in our sample. As mentioned
earlier, Luxembourg and Sweden are not included, due to missing information
on earnings.
Based on both, sample and population size, we choose to focus our further
investigation on the gender wage gaps in the five largest EU countries, Germany,
France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. From the ECHP, we choose the
1998 cross section to facilitate comparison with the results published in the
report Employment in Europe 2002 (European Commission 2002a).
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Table 3: Goodness of fit for female wages
Estimation model No. of obs. Mean wage Std. dev.
Actual wage 2,015 9.80 4.57
OLS 1,985 9.82 2.73
Heckman 1,982 9.82 2.75
Lewbel 1,884 9.83 2.84
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed at least 8 hours per week.
4 Results
We investigate various estimation techniques and the resulting decomposition
effects. For the 1998 German sample of the ECHP data set, we provide results
for both the Oaxaca-Blinder and the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce wage gap decom-
positions, based on three different estimators for the wage equations: OLS,
two-stage Heckman, and Lewbel. For the latter, we only report results from the
simplest version (with parametric estimation of f(S|U), see 2), since performing
a non-parametric estimation for the first stage had only a small impact on the
estimated coefficients. For the other four countries we present only the wage
gap decompositions based on the Lewbel estimates.
4.1 Wage equation estimation for Germany
As the male participation rate is 99%, the wage equation for men is estimated
by OLS. For decompositions based on the Lewbel method, both wage equa-
tions, for males and females, result from the Lewbel procedure. As explanatory
variables we include individual characteristics (such as age, education, tenure,
information on household composition and regional information) and job char-
acteristics (firm size, sector, occupational group). The participation equation
for the Heckman two-step procedure is set up with age, family status, children,
non-earned income and various interaction terms as independent variables. The
selection correction variable turns out to be statistically significant, with a neg-
ative coefficient, and thus a negative correlation between unobservables in the
participation equation and in the wage equation. This result underlines the
necessity to correct for sample selection, since the parameters would not be
estimated consistently otherwise.
As the special variable in the Lewbel model, we use annual non-work net
household income. In addition, we experimented with the respective non-work
individual income, as well as total household income, excluding only the indi-
vidual’s labour earnings. The first measure performed best with regard to the
predicted wages. We opt for the non-earned household income for theoretical
reasons also, since this income measure is less likely to be correlated with the
individual wage rate than the other candidates examined.
Table 3 summarises the predictive performance of the competing wage equa-
tion models. The variance of the predicted wages is largest in the Lewbel model.
The Lewbel predictions therefore represent best the spread of the actual wage
distribution.
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The estimation results for the German sample are listed in Appendix 1. The
results for the other countries can be found in Beblo et al. (2003).
4.2 Wage decomposition
We discuss in turn the Oaxaca-Blinder and Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition
results.
4.2.1 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
As illustrated in Figure 2 the magnitude of the various terms in the raw wage
gap decomposition differ remarkably depending on the wage regression model
used. According to the OLS estimation, a little bit more than 50% of the Ger-
man wage differential can be explained by different endowments of women and
men. The remaining half is due to differences in the remuneration of these en-
dowments. The results of the Lewbel procedure reflect an endowment effect of
similar size. The selection effect from the Heckman regression corresponds to a
negative selection on unobservables (negative correlation between the unobserv-
ables in both equations). Note, however, that this means that a woman with a
relatively low predicted probability of participation is predicted to earn less con-
ditional on participation than a woman with the same productivity endowment
X but a higher predicted probability of participation. The Heckman findings
for Germany reveal that the potential wage gap between women and men, in
the absence of selection, would be lower than observed. No selection effect is
displayed for the Lewbel estimation since selection is not estimated explicitly,
but it shows off indirectly in the unobervables whereas the unobservable effect is
restricted to zero on average for OLS and Heckman estimates. The Lewbel esti-
mate tells us that unobserved characteristics of women lead to an offered wage
gap which exceeds the observed wage gap, contrary to the findings obtained
with the Heckman estimates.
In levels, the offered gender wage gaps estimated with the Lewbel approach
in the other country samples differ from the German sample in both directions.
However, according to Figure 3, the fraction explained by different endowments
of women and men is generally smaller in the other countries. Consequently, the
remuneration effect, that is, the relative effect of differences in remuneration, is
larger. Italy and Spain have a negative endowment effect. This means that if
Italian and Spanish women had the same characteristics as Italian and Spanish
men they would receive even lower wages than observed. In Italy the gap in
potential wages is almost 50% higher than that in observed wages.
4.2.2 Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions of the gender wage gaps within countries
are displayed in Figures 4 to 10 in Appendix 1. Recall that the advantage
of this approach is that it allows an investigation of the wage gap over the
whole wage distribution. It thus relates to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
by disentangling the pay difference at the overall sample mean into quantile
gaps. To illustrate this feature let us take a closer look at the German example.
In the Figures 4 to 6 the raw wage gap is displayed according to the wage
rankings of all women and men in the sample. As in the figures on the raw
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Figure 2: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender wage gap in Germany.
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 year old women and
men, who are employed at least 8 hours per week.
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Figure 3: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender wage gap in selected EU
countries
Data source: ECHP, country files 1998. Sample of 25-55 year old women and men,
who are employed at least 8 hours per week.
Note: Decomposition based on the Lewbel wage regression.
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pay gap, women and men are ranked separately by their wage rate and then
compared pairwise in each decile of the distribution.10 That is, the mean wage
of the 10% lowest paid women is now compared with the mean wage of the
10% lowest paid men. This gap is displayed as the first observation to the left
of the panel. As the wage distributions of women and men are not congruent
typically, the decile gaps also reflect the extent to which male and female wage
dispersions differ.
In the German case lowest-wage earners face a gender wage gap of about
31%. The raw gap first decreases and then increases when moving up the
income distribution. For middle-wage earners it is as low as 20% whereas for
high-wage women it amounts to 28%. As in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
the raw gap can be decomposed into an endowment and a remuneration effect.
Furthermore, since we are no longer confined to the sample means, the effect of
unobservables can also be illustrated. The fraction of the wage gap explained by
different endowments of women and men increases over the wage distribution.
While taking up only about 20% at the lower end of the wage distribution, it
accounts to more than 80% of the gap between high-wage women and their
male counterparts. The remuneration effect has the reverse pattern. Different
remuneration of characteristics seems to affect mostly women at the lower end
of the wage scale. Unobservables take up some of the wage gap for low income
receivers but their effect is close to zero for the rest.
In contrast to Figure 4, Figure 5 is based on selectivity corrected wage es-
timations for the female sample. As seen in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
above, the selection effect corresponds to a negative selection on unobservables.
It takes up part of the observed wage gap. This means that the offered wage
gap is smaller than the observed wage gap. Remarkably enough, this applies
to the whole of the wage distribution to more or less the same extent. As was
already the case for the Oaxaca-Blinder representation, the Lewbel estimates
differ quite a bit from the Heckman estimates when differentiated over deciles
(see Figure 6). While the increasing pattern of the endowment effect with rising
wage is confirmed, the remuneration effect decreases from the second decile on,
for the Heckman estimates, but its profile is more or less flat according to the
Lewbel estimates.
In France the U-shape of the raw gender wage gap is quite pronounced (see
Figure 7). Starting with some 25% in the lowest decile, the gap diminishes
to little more than 10% for the rest of the wage distribution, except for the
highest earners where it amounts to 18%. In contrast to the German case,
the explanatory power of the endowment effect varies a lot over the income
distribution. Also the pattern of unobservables shows more volatility for France
due to, first, the better specification of the wage equation model in Germany,
and second, the smaller sample size for France. As a consequence, the quasi-
totality of the raw wage gap in France is attributed to a different remuneration
of women and men. The UK graph reveals a similar pattern, although the
endowment effect takes up a larger fraction of the pay gap, and so does the
Spanish. In Italy only the wage difference of the highest earners can be explained
by different endowments of women and men.
10Note that the the raw wage gap was displayed by percentile.
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5 Conclusion
Based on the European Community Household Panel for five European coun-
tries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) we investigate
different techniques to assess the gender pay gap in the European Union. These
different techniques concern the estimation of wage equations as well as the
decomposition of the estimated gaps. Our comparative study shows that at
most 50% of the difference in payment between the sexes can be attributed to
differences in characteristics. However, the size of the endowment effect differs
considerably between countries. It depends on the information used and on the
estimation model and decomposition method applied.
Regarding the wage estimation, we find that a selectivity correction may have
a significant impact both on wage estimates and on the pay gap decomposition:
our results suggest that, for Germany, the offered wage gap is smaller than
the observed wage gap on the basis of the Heckman estimates, but the reverse
using the Lewbel estimates. Therefore, careful attention should be paid to
the choice of estimation method. We prefer the Lewbel approach because it is
less restrictive on the structure of the data. No structure is imposed on the
distribution of the error terms, permitting a more general form of unknown
heteroscedasticity.11
Regarding the wage decomposition, another main result of the study is de-
rived from the decomposition over quantiles of the wage distribution (Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce method). Remarkable differences are revealed within as
well as between countries. A further recommendation derived from our anal-
ysis would therefore be to pay careful attention to differences over the wage
distribution when drawing policy conclusions.
Future research may include applications of further wage estimation tech-
niques (e.g. quantile regression) and gap decomposition methods (e.g. Machado
and Mata 2003). Furthermore, confidence bands for the adusted pay gap should
be investigated, as well as for the different effects in the wage decomposition.
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6 Appendix 1: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce figures
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Source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 
year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 4: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in Ger-
many (OLS wage estimation)
22
-0,15
-0,05
0,05
0,15
0,25
0,35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Raw wage gap
Endowment Effect
Unobservables Effect
Remuneration Effect
Selection Effect
Source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 
year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 5: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in Ger-
many (Heckman two-step wage estimation)
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Source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 
year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 6: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in Ger-
many (Lewbel two-step wage estimation)
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Source: ECHP, French data file 1998. Sample of 25-
55 year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 7: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in France
(Lewbel two-step wage estimation)
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Source: ECHP, Italian data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 
year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 8: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in Italy
(Lewbel two-step wage estimation)
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Source: ECHP,Spanish data file 1998. Sample of 25-
55 year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 9: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in Spain
(Lewbel two-step wage estimation)
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Source: ECHP,British data file 1998. Sample of 25-55 
year olds, employed at least 8 hours per week.
Figure 10: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the gender wage gap in the
UK (Lewbel two-step wage estimation)
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7 Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics and wage
estimation results for Germany
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Germany (whole sample)
Men Women
Variable name Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
a_y Dummy: age<30 .19 .40 .20 .40
a_m Dummy: age 30-45 .53 .50 .51 .50
age Age 38.73 8.38 38.99 8.42
mar Dummy: married .72 .45 .74 .44
mar_coh Dummy: married .82 .38 .84 .37
or cohabiting
educ_3 Dummy: higher education .27 .44 .20 .40
educ_2 Dummy: secondary education .57 .50 .58 .49
sizehh_015 Number of children <16 .86 1.00 .84 1.01
sizehh_1415 Number of Children 14-15 .14 .37 .17 .41
sizehh Household size 3.19 1.26 3.16 1.25
child_0 Dummy: newborn .06 .23 .03 .17
child_011 Dummy: child<12 .39 .49 .35 .48
child_111 Dummy: child 1-11 .34 .47 .32 .47
income_ne Annual hh income
− individual earnings 11807.86 9580.88 20202.43 13194.17
east Dummy: living in east Germany .24 .43 .23 .42
citizen_other Dummy: non EU citizen .09 .29 .11 .31
citizen_EU Dummy: EU citizen .07 .25 .05 .23
ihhu Annual nonearned hh income 1401.35 4906.59 1685.38 5349.64
job_part Dummy: participation .99 .10 .77 .42
# obs. 2562 2577
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women and
men, who are employed or out of the labour force.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Germany (only working individuals)
Men Women
Variable name Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
job_magr Dummy: legislators. senior .09 .28 .03 .07
officials and managers
job_prof Dummy: professionals .12 .32 .10 .30
job_cler Dummy: clerks .07 .26 .24 .43
job_sale Dummy: service and .04 .20 .14 .34
sales workers
job_wagr Dummy: skilled agricultural .01 .10 .01 .10
and fishery workers
job_wser Dummy: craft and related .33 .47 .04 .19
trades workers
job_wqua Dummy: plant and machine .15 .36 .19 .22
operators and assemblers
job_welm Dummy: elementary occupations .07 .25 .11 .31
job_sizelow Dummy: small size firm .19 .40 .24 .43
job_sizemid Dummy: middle size firm .55 .50 .43 .50
job_public Dummy: public sector .20 .40 .36 .48
job_tenure Firm tenure (years) 7.39 6.40 5.95 5.90
job_pc Dummy: permanent contract .94 .23 .87 .34
job_break Dummy: job interruption .13 .34 .17 .38
hours_pt Dummy: part time employment .00 .06 .16 .37
wage_grossm Hourly gross wage 12.30 6.50 9.79 4.59
# obs. 2388 1747
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women and
men, who are employed at least 8 hours per week.
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Table 6: OLS wage estimation for German women 1998
log wage_grossm Coef. T-stat.
job_magr .1836 3.94
job_prof .2526 8.38
job_wagr -.4525 -6.00
job_cler -.0722 -3.41
job_sale -.2790 -10.89
job_wser -.1897 -4.47
job_wqua -.2249 -5.92
job_welm -.3590 -12.55
job_public .0736 4.21
job_sizelow -.2256 -10.50
job_sizemid -.0615 -3.31
educ_3 .0992 3.32
educ_2 .0634 2.86
job_tenure .0259 5.61
job_tenure2 -.0006 -2.43
east -.2417 -13.65
constant 2.2417 74.20
obs 1985
R-squared .4108
Adj R-squared .4060
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed at least 8 hours per week.
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Table 7: OLS wage estimation for German men 1998
log wage_grossm Coef. T-stat.
log age 3.9321 3.63
(log age)2 -.5282 -3.53
log (age× educ_3) .3369 4.82
job_magr .2060 7.21
job_prof .1548 5.68
job_wagr -.2204 -3.23
job_cler -.0235 -0.79
job_sale -.1949 -5.54
job_wser -.0913 -4.16
job_wqua -.1256 -4.95
job_welm -.1864 -5.95
job_public -.0631 -3.71
job_break -.1264 -6.45
sizehh_015 .0222 3.27
hours_pt -.3935 -4.04
job_sizelow -.2976 -14.78
job_sizemid -.1280 -8.34
educ_3 -1.1194 -4.36
educ_2 .0421 2.23
job_tenure .0052 4.23
east -.3442 -22.23
constant -4.6979 -2.41
obs. 2388
R-squared 0.4513
Adj R-squared 0.4464
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old men, who are
employed at least 8 hours per week.
29
Table 8: Probit participation estimation for German women 1998
job_part Coef. T-stat.
a_y .5354 4.35
a_m .3982 4.64
lage_ch0 3.5495 3.57
lage_ch111 1.4292 3.91
mar -.7473 -5.24
mar_coh .5489 3.10
log income_ne -.3555 -2.65
child_0 -14.3697 -4.12
child_111 -6.0151 -4.60
educ_3 .8160 6.91
educ_2 .4454 6.08
east .7322 7.56
constant 4.0094 3.15
obs 2608
Pseudo R2 .2719
Log pseudo-likelihood -1017.9915
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed or out of the labour force.
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Table 9: Heckman wage estimation for German women 1998
log wage_grossm Coef. T-stat.
job_magr .1866 4.01
job_prof .2496 8.29
job_wagr -.4650 -6.20
job_cler -.0702 -3.32
job_sale -.2759 -10.78
job_wser -.1852 -4.37
job_wqua -.2190 -5.77
job_welm -.3412 -11.82
job_public .0738 4.22
job_pc .0676 2.78
job_sizelow -.2362 -10.78
job_sizemid -.0733 -3.86
educ_3 .0782 2.52
educ_2 .0474 2.06
job_tenure .0138 10.16
east -.2550 -13.72
lmbd -.0886 -2.75
constant 2.2603 58.91
obs 1982
R-squared .4143
Adj R-squared .4092
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed at least 8 hours per week.
Table 10: Lewbel regression for Germany 1998, 1. stage: density function for
women
ihhu Coef. T-stat.
log age -15.1919 -2.08
(log age)2 2.2318 2.21
educ_3 1.1174 7.45
educ_2 .6172 5.15
east -.4282 -3.97
child_0 .6529 2.57
citizen_other -1.221 -7.89
cititzen_EU -.6343 -3.24
sizehh_015 -.0592 -1.21
constant 30.9817 2.36
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed at least 8 hours.
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Table 11: Lewbel regression for Germany 1998, 2. stage: selectivity-corrected
wage estimation for women
log wage_grossm Coef. T-stat.
log age 8.6983 2.08
(log age)2 -1.1965 -2.09
job_magr .1838 .81
job_prof .3042 3.14
job_wagr -.0463 -.57
job_cler -.3233 -3.75
job_sale -.5803 -3.70
job_wser .1484 1.14
job_wqua -.3357 -2.58
job_welm -.5323 -5.63
job_sizelow -.2767 -3.57
job_sizemid -.1141 -1.61
educ_3 -.1357 -1.57
educ_2 -.0648 -.82
job_tenure .0171 3.32
east -.2005 -3.49
constant -13.3174 -1.75
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old women, who
are employed at least 8 hours per week.
Table 12: Lewbel regression for Germany 1998, 1. stage: density function for
men
income_ne coef. t-stat.
mar_coh -1.96 -2.46
mar_coh× log age .649 3.03
sizehh_015 -.149 -3.42
educ_3 1.48 10.6
educ_2 .661 5.27
east -.542 -5.57
citizen_other -.869 -5.69
cititzen_EU -.514 -2.98
constant 4.84 32.5
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old men, who are
employed or out of the labour force.
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Table 13: Lewbel regression for Germany 1998, 2. stage: selectivity-corrected
wage estimation for men
log wage_grossm coef. t-stat.
job_magr .404 4.92
job_prof .068 .90
job_cler -.013 -.16
job_sale -.287 -3.41
job_wagr -.190 -1.34
job_twser -.132 -1.90
job_wqua -.188 -2.27
job_welme -.216 -2.54
job_sizelow -.177 -2.80
job_sizemid -.033 -.69
job_break -.097 -1.81
sizehh_015 .054 2.89
educ_3 .216 3.35
educ_2 .110 2.21
job_tenure .011 3.45
east -.366 -6.52
hours_pt -.322 -2.96
constant 2.39 25.4
Data source: ECHP, German data file 1998. Samples of 25-55 year old men, who are
employed at least 8 hours per week.
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